Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President, S. Rep. No. 89-66 by Committee on the Judiciary. Senate. United States.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Congressional Materials Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive
2-10-1965
Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in
the Office of Vice President, S. Rep. No. 89-66
Committee on the Judiciary. Senate. United States.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials
Part of the Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Congressional Materials by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Committee on the Judiciary. Senate. United States., "Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President, S.
Rep. No. 89-66" (1965). Congressional Materials. 13.
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials/13
Calendar No. 62
89TH CONGRESS SENATE ( REPORT
1st Session No. 66
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
FEnBUARY 10, 1965.-Ordered to be printed
Mir. BAY1I, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted
the following
REPORT
together with
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. J. Res. 1]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the reso-lution (S.J. Res. 1), proposing,an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommendsthat the resolution as amended be agreed to.
AMENDMENTS
On page 2, in line 14, strike "If the Preoident declares in writing"
and insert in lieu thereof: "Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives his written declaration".
On page 2, strike the entire text of section 4, and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of the princi-
pal officers of the executive departments or such other body
as Con(resf; may by law provide, transmit to the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-tives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the pov .'s and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
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On page 3, in lines 1 and 2, strike the word "Con- gress" and insertin lieu thereof the following:
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives
On page 3, in line 5, strike the word "heads" and insert in lieu
thereof the following: "principal officers".On page 3, in line 9, strike the words "will immediately" and insertin lieu thereof "shall immediately proceed to".
PURPOSE OF AMENDMENTS
The text of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, requires, under
certain contingencies, for a written declaration to be made by the
President, under section 3, and by the Vice President and principal
officers of the executive departments under section 4, anid by thePresident, the Vice President and principal officers of the executivedepartments under section 5. It is the intention of the committeethat for the best interests of the country to be served, notice by allparties should be public notice. The committee feels that notice bytransmittal to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives guarantees notice to the entire country.The committee is concerned about the possibility that such writtendeclaration might be transmitted during a period in which Congress
was not in session. In this event the committee feels that transmittal
of such written declaration to the presiding officers of both Houses,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, would be sufficient transmittal under the terms of this
amendment.
It is the opinion of the committee that, under the language of
section 5, Congress is empowered to reconvene in special session to
consider any disability question arising under this section. Further-
more, under the language of this section, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives would be required
to call a special session of the Congress to consider the question ofpresidential inability whenever the President's ability to perform thepowers and duties of his office are questioned under the terms of
section 5. However, nothing contained in this proposed amendment
should be construed to limit the power of the President from exercisinghis existing constitutional authority to call for a special session of
the Congress.
It is further understood by the committee that should the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives not befound in their offices at the time the declaration was transmitted that
transmittal to the office of such presiding officers would suffice for
sufficient notice under the ternis of this amendment.
It is the judgment of the committee that the language "principal
officers of the executive departments" more adequately conveys theintended meaning of sections 4 and 5, that only those members of thePresident's official Cabinet were to participate in any decision ofdisability referred to under these sections. This language findsprecedent under article II, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution.
The pertinent language there reads as follows:
he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principalOfficer in each of the executive Departments,
2
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In its discussion of the ramifications of section 5, the committee
considered it important to add additional stress to the interpretation
of two questions which might arise:(1) Who has the powers and duties of the office of the President
while the provisions of section 5 are being implemented?(2) Under what. sense of urgency is Congress required to act in
carrying out provisions of this section?
Under the terms of section 3 a President who voluntarily transfershis powers and duties to the Vice President may resume these powers
and duties by making a written declaration of his ability to perform
the powers and duties of his office and transmitting such declaration
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives. This will reduce the reluctance of the President to utilize
the provisions of this section in the event he fears it would be difficult
for him to regain his powers and duties once he has voluntarily
relinquished them.
However, the intent of section 5 is that the Vice President is to
continue to exercise the powers and duties of the office of Acting Presi-dent until a determination on the President's inability is made byCongress. It is also the intention of the committee that the Con-gress should act swiftly in making this determination, but with suffi-
cient opportunity to gather whatever evidence it determined necessary
to make such a final determination. The language, as amended, reads
Ias follows:
Thereupon Congress shall immediately proceed to decide theissue.
It was the opinion of the committee that the words "Thereupon",
"shall", and "immediately" were sufficiently strong to indicate the
necessity for prompt action.
Precedence for the use of the word "immediately" and the inter-pretation thereof may be found in the use of this same word, "im-
mediately" in the 12th amendment to the Constitution. In the 12th
amlendnlent, in the event no candidate for President receives a
Majority of the electoral votes, the House of Representatives "shall
choose immediatelyy,. The committee was of the opinion that the
salle sense of urgency attendant to the use of the word "immediately"in the 12th amendment when Congress was in fact deciding who
would be the President of the United States should be attendant in
proceedings in which the Congress was deciding whether the President
of the United States should be removed from his office because of
his inability to perform the powers and duties thereof.The committee is concerned that congressional action under the
terns of section 5 should be taken under the greatest sense of urgency.
HIowever, because of the complexities involved in determining different
types of disability, it is felt unwise to prescribe any specific timelillitation to congressional deliberation thereupon. Indeed, the
com.llittee feels that Congress should be permitted to collect all
necessary evidence and to participate in the debate needed to make
a considered judgment.
The discussion of the committee made it abundantly clear that the
Proceedings in the Congress prescribed in. section 5 would be pursued
under rules prescribed, or to be prescribed, by the Congress itself.
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PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION AS AMENDED
The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as amended is to providefor continuity in the office of the Chief Executive [in the event that
the President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the
office] and further, to provide for the filling of vacancies in the office
of the Vice President whenever such vacancies may occur.
STATEMENT
The constitutional provisions
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the executivepower at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a Presi-dent. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the Office of the Vice President. Article II, section1, clause 5 reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge thePowers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law providefor the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,both of the President and Vice President, declaring whatOfficer shall then act as President, and such Officer slhall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by theConstitutional Conventioln upon recomllmcendation of the Colmmrittee
on Style. When this portion of the (onstitution was submitted tothat Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the Presidelnt's) removal ats aforesaid,death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge tllePowers of duties o his office, thle Vice President shall exer-cise those powers t1nd dutsisItl another l'reisident be
chosen, or until tile inability of the Presidenlt be removed.
The Legislaturelmay declare by law wlht officer of theUnited States sllill act, ts President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of tlle PI'(sident at(d Vice lPresillnt;
and such officer shalll act accordingly, until such disabilityb1 re'mloved, or I IPresident shall 1)c elected.
While the Comnmitteo on Style was given no authority to change the
substance of prior determinations of the ConventionI, it is clear that
this portion of the (lraft which tliat Comnllittee ultimately submitted
was a consi(lral)le ilteraltion of tile proposalswlich tell ConlilIitteehad received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the provisionS as they relate to inability.o Is of1' C, . ion,on to inability.As a matterC of fact, tlhe records of the( onvention contain only one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with the
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question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to bethe judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the ConstitutionalConvention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Conventiondisclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice Presi-dent John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United States.While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of SenatorWilliam Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognizedby both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Con-gressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 31-
June 1, 1841).
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
tile United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt
Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this
planner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish aprecedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, orinability. In all four contingencies the Constitution states: "the
samen shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon himn by reason of
the resign,.ion, inability, or removal from office of the President.(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)
'TleT'yler precedent, therefore has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office ulponl recovery. 'Professor I)wight. who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
.tliat tlhe Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power andduties of the office, to "devolve" upont the Vice President, is silent on
tile return of the office or its functions to tile President upon recovery.Whlore boll the President nlld Vice President atre incapable of serving,tiho Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
sliall act as Presidlent "until tile disability is relloved."
'I'hese considerations apparently moved persons such as DanielW\eblster, who was Secretary of State whenl Tyler took office as Presi-(lent, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
a
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office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency. Thisinterpretation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5 of the Constitution which provides that:
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States. [Italic supplied.]
The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed materi-
ally to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which heperformed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be disposed of by theheads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision,
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler and Prof.Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedlyincluded the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it wouldbe desirable for the Vice President to act but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them frompresenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. Thisdamage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as the Shan-
tung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's
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wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screeningboard on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impairment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "My Memoirs,"
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White House," pp.
105-106; Tumulty, 'Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
of the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such a possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, thePresident caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "Woodrow
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidentsinvolving the physical health of the President served to focus attention
on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in theConstitution relative to Presidential inability and he attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with Vice
President Nixon. The agreement provided:
1. In the event of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appro-priate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolu-
tion of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.3. The President, in either event, would determine when theinability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with VicePresident Johnson as did President Johnson with Speaker John
McCormack and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Such informal
agreements cannot be considered an adequate solution to the problembecause: (A.) Their operation would differ according to the relation-
ship between the particular holders of the offices; (B) a private
agreement cannot give the Vice President clear authority to dis-
charge powers conferred on the President by the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for the situation in
which a dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rooers as well as AttorneyGeneral Kennedy agree that the only definitive method to settle the
problem is by means of a constitutional amendment.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The
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clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
which may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determi-
nation of inability to any individual or group, nor does it defineinability so that the existence of such a status may be open and
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice Presi-dent acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails todefine the period during which the Vice President serves. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives
of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President has in fact recoveredfrom his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be preventedfromdoing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Execu-
tive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive authority is
more important today than ever before. The concern which has been
mainfested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, isincreased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of theincreased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world.
-- This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified exami-
nation of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized because
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested pro-
vision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE
In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could con-
stitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep-
resentati s, 66th Congress, 2d session,, considered the problem,
Represew".lvives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep-
resentatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the presidential inability
problem.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. They
point out that article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution author-ized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the Presi-dent and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication
Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
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situation which concerns only a, disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presi-dential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framera of the Constitution did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).Serious doubts have also been raised .as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitutiondoes not vest any department or office with the power to determineinability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and at what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
that article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the Congress the authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinionin favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment isneces-
sary, and that a mere statute would not. be adequate to solve theproblem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and, Acting AttorneyGeneral Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment '
necessary. In addition to the American Bar Association and the
American Association of Law Schools.' the following organizationshave agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,Hawaii,Indiana Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and thebar. associations of Denver, Colo.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New YoriktPassaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.O.; York County, Pa.; andMilwaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitutionis that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had becomedisabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to.adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination'
of the commencement and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the Office of the President
While the records of the Consittutiona4 Convention disclosedlittle insight on the fraiers' interpretation of the.inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide'ddisagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.The creation ofi the office of Vice President came in the closing
days of the Consitutional Convention. Although such a portion
was consideredyery early in the Convention, later, proposals envisagedthe President of twe Senate, the Chief Justice and even a council of
advisers as persons who would dire t the executive branch should alapse of Executive authority come to pass;
S. aBpt 60, 8-1---
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,On September 4, 1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed,recom-
mended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties tobe performed' by the occupant of the office Although much de-liberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice Presi-dent to the office of President in case of the death of the President'.
A committee, designated to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September12,- 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become' theConstitution of the United States. It contemplated two officialduties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing' the votes of the presidential electors, and(2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of his.death, resignation, removal, or inability.While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, theimportance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparentby article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provisionfor the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed.to insure that the Vice President wasa person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Convention, however, was totally frustrated when-
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
was made painfully apparent in -the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances. '
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with, the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appeasedisappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in ensu-ing years to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority. anddisparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the .Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council;Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Op-.portunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for the President, He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The death of Presiaent Kennedy and the accession of PresidentJohnson in 1963 pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the'executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen
times the United States of America has been without a Vice President,
totaling 37 years during our history.
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As has bden pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
wisdom.foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did 'not,however, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled,
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional
amendment'are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However,
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and sup-ported by many individuals. We must not gamble with the consti-tutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
-The argument that Congress can designate a Vice President by lawis at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is meas-
ured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6 which states that-
the Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation, or Inability both of the President andVice President, declaring what officer shall then act as Presi-dent, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
and powers of the office of.President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor Vice President to act.
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of the
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice Presidentiipon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, fpr
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?The answer to that question is "Yes." The Constitution has given
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article , section 2, clause 4,provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Sehate
anrd clause S provides that the Senate shall choose its other, officersincluding a 'President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice Presi-dent or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." ' It is very difficult to argue that a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the pro-
cedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22 can be, the President oftheSenate,' .. . .3
'One'of the6 principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President
when.it. becomes vacant is to permit the person next inline to become
,
....:, ..
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familiar with the problems he will face should he be called -tpon to act
as President, e.g,, to serve on the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, partici-pate in Cabinet meetings and take part m other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential suc-
cession law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time ofhis designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficulttime carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer itdesignates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations lead-
ing to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice-Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure what-
ever it be.
,Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argumentin favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority con-
cerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With thisdivision in existence it woul seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolutelegitimacy was needed.
ANALYSIS
Inability
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a con-
stitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution is unclear on twoimportant points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the VicePresident in the event of Presidential inability. The second is whohaw the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1. resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which aVice President has become President upon the death of the President,further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office, It separates the provisions relating to inabilityfrom those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliii-
nating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.Sections 3, 4, and 5 embrace the procedures for determining the
commencement iad termination of Presidential inability.Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that hasheretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the lie f succession It makes Clar
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upn
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
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By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes
clear that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the
office" that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the
status of the Vice President during the period when he is dischargingthe powers and duties of a disabled President,Section 4 is the first step of two, that embraces the most difficultproblem of inability-the factual. determination of whether .or notinability exists. Under this section, if a President does not declare
that an inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the Presi-
dent is disabled shall, with the written approval of a majority of theheads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of thepowers and duties of the Office as Acting President upon the transmis.
sion of such declaration to the Congress.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpation. No mechanical .or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most ofthe parties are rogues and in which n6 popular sense of constitutionalpropriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted thatpresumes we shall always be dealing with 'reasonable men" at thehighest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of theVice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears tofurnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicialbranches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to thePresident, both politically and physically, and presumably:mostfamiliar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distinguished advocates for a specially constitutedgroup in the nature of a factfinding body to determine presidentialinability r ,her than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many dilem '. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannotdeclare his Owl ability the factual determination of inability.wouldbe relatively simple. Noneed would exist for a special factfindiiibody; Nor is a factfinding body necessary if the President' cah anddoes declare ,his own ability.: If, however the: President and those
aroun him 'differ as to whethiqrhe does suffer from an inability wiuchhe is unwilling to admit, then' critical dispute exists. But this dis2
pute should.not be determined by a pecil' commission coiipo6ed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such' a commission runs a ibod
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be theeffect,for example, if a commission of seven voted 4 to' 3 that the Presi-dent was fit and able tpo perform his iOffce? What power would he
exert during the rst of his term when, by common knowIede ',
change of one voe in the commission proceeding could yet deny hinthe 4ight to ercise the pwers his Office? If the vote'werfT th
other way and the Vice frsidet were'inistfalled 's Acting Piesdtit
what powers coiild he' eert wbt; .,a eyerycneDold no*.that 6oni v6'
the other way could cause his suimmar removal from' tihe ekiert6.
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placed
s13
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in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the in-
ternational position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different bodyif this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience.Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President
to resume the powers and duties of the office upon his transmission
ti the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives of his written declaration that no inability existed. How-
ever, should the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then
they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties
of the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represent-
atives within 2 days. Once the declaration of the President stating
no inability exists has been transmitted to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then the issue is
squarely joined. At this point the proposal recommends that the
Congress shall make the final determination on the existence ofinability. If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable, then the Vice President continues
as Acting President. However, should the Congress fail in any man-
ner to cast a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the
position that the President was unable to perform the powers andduties of his office, then the President would resume the powers andduties of the office. The recommendation for a vote of two-thirds
is in conformity with the provision of article I, section 3, clause'6, of
the Constitution relating to impeachments.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transferin Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and 'with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vaanie8
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always possess a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person who meets the existing constitutional qualificationsto. be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office as Vice President once he had been
confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Congress.
*, In considering this section of the proposal, it was observed that the
office of the Vice President has become one of. the most important
positions in our country. The days are long past whn, it was largelyhonorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific and
important responsibilities in the executive branch of Government.He has come to share and participate in the exe utive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy, there would be nobreak in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterripted
assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
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It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is com-
patible with the President. The importance of this compatibility
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political partiesin according the presidential candidate a voice in choosing his running
mate subject to convention approval. This proposal would permit
the President to choose his Vice President subject to congressional
approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice Presi-dent of the same political party as the President, someone who wouldpresumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the President.
CONCLUSION
This amendment seeks to remove a vexatious constitutional prob-
lem from the realm of national concern. It seeks to concisely clarify
the ambiguities of the present provision in the Constitution. In sodoing, it recognizes the vast importance of the office involved, and the
necessity to maintain continuity of the Executive power of the United
States.
The committee approved this proposal after its subcommittee heard
testimony and received written statements from many distinguished
students on the subject. Last year the subcommittee also had thebenefit of considerable study reflected in congressional documentspreviously published on this subject. In the light of all this material
and evidence, and for the fact that 76 Senators have sponsored Senate
Joint Resolution 1, the committee believes that a serious constitutional
gap exists with regard to Presidential inability and vacancies in the
office of the Vice President, and that the proposal which is now
presented is the best solution to the problem.
RECOMMENDATION
The committee, after considering the several proposals now pendingbefore it relating to the matter of Presidential inability, reports favor-
ably on Senate Joint Resolution 1 and recommends its submission to
the legislatures of the several States of the United States so that it
may become a part of the Constitution of the United States.
COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER AND RETAINED WORDING
The committee amendments to the Senate joint resolution are shoWn
as follows: Provisions of the resolution as introduced which are
omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics,provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
"Article-
SEC. 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shallbecome President.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, th'e President shall nominate a Vice President
15
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who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.SEc. 3. [If the President declares in writing] Whenever thePresident transmits to the President of the Senate and theSpeaker of the House of Representatives his written declarationthat he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of hisOffice such powers and duties shall be discharged by theVice President as Acting President.SEC. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the]Whenever the Vice President [with the written concurrence
of] and a majority of the heads] principal officers of the
executive departments or such other body as Congress mayby law provide, transmit[s] to the [Congress hisjPresident
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representativestheir written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vide Presi-dent shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.SEC. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the [Con-
res] President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House ofRepreentatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a
majority of the [heads] principal oilers of the executivedepartments or such other body as Congress may by lawprovide, transmits within two days tothe Congres his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress[will] shall immediately proceed to decide the issue IftheCongress determines by two-thirds vote of both Housesthat the President is unable to discharge the powers andduties of the office, the Vice President shall continue todischarge the same as Acting President; other e thePresident shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
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When the Congress considers amendments to the Constitution, itdeals not with the problems of today, or yesterday, or tomorrow, butin terms of the grand sweep of our Nation's history and future. TheConstitution is the basic charter of our Government. It is appro-
priate to keep its function separate from the various laws we derivefrom it, laws that are designed to meet specific problems as they may
arise. The Constitution must meet the test of time. It can do this
only if it provides the means by which the Congress may meet the
needs of the moment, not the solution to specific problems.
The questions of Presidential succession and Presidential inability
are not new to the Senate. It has been wrestling with them for many
years. Time and again it has tried its hand at contriving an amend-
ment to the Constitution to deal with the problems. But each time
when the Senate almost reaches a conclusion as to language for the
amendment it becomes aware that its labors have been so narrowlydirected to the problems arising out of particular events that it hasfailed to think and write in the broad fundamental concepts which are
necessary to a constitutional amendment. And then, because it
realizes the dangers of a job half done, it does nothing at all.
Congress cannot go along that way any further. It must deal with
the problems of Presidential succession and Presidential inability by a
constitutional amendment. It is necessary that the pertinent pro-
vision of the Constitution dealing with vacancy or inability, article
II, section 1, that reads as follows:
In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or ofhis Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for theCase of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of
the President and the Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accord-
ingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shallbe elected.
be amended to clarify whether the devolution is of the Office of the
President or only of his powers and duties. Presumably it is theformer in the case of death or resignation and the latter in case ofinability. Be that as it may, it has been the uncertainty of con-
struction of this language that in the past has prevented Vice Presi-dents from assuming authority during the periods of disability of
various Presidents. Next, it is essential that the Constitution provide
a means of dealing with the other matters encompassed in SenateJoint Resolution 1. But the amendment should not deal with details.
They can be handled by statute and rightly should be.
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This solution was well laid out before this committee last year and 2
years ago by the then Deputy Attorney General of the United States,Mr. Katzenbach. His entire statement in the 1963 hearings, in-
corporated again in the 1964 hearings, should be read by everyone whois considering this problem. Let me only emphasize his concludingthoughts:
Apart from the wisdom of loading the Constitution downby writing detailed procedural and substantive provisionsinto it has been questioned by many scholars and statesmen.
The framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom of usingbroad and expanding concepts and principles that could be
adjusted to keep pace with current needs. The changes are
that supplemental legislation would be required in any event.
In addition, crucial and urgent new situations may arisein the changing future-not covered by Senate Joint Reso-lution 28 '-where it may be of importance that Congress,
with the President's approval, should be able to act promptly
without being required to resort to still another amend-
ment to the Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution 35 1
makes this possible; Senate Joint Resolution 28 1 does not.
Since it is difficult to foresee all of the possible circum-
stances in which the Presidential inability problem could
arise we are opposed to any constitutional amendment
which attempts to solve all these questions by a series of
complex procedures. We think that the best solution to
the basic problems that remain would be a simple consti-tutional amendment, such as Senate Joint Resolution 35,1
which treats the contingency of inability differently from
situations such as death, removal, or resignation, which
states that the Vice President in case ofresidential in-
ability succeeds only to the powers and duties of the Office
as Acting President and not to the Office itself, and whichdeclares that the commencement and termination of anyinability may be determined by such methods as Congressby law shall provide. Such an amendment would supplythe flexibility which we think is indispensable and, at the
same time, put to rest what legal problems may exist under
the present provisions of the Constitution as supplementedby practice and understanding.
Senate Joint Resolution 35, referred to by Mr. Katzenbach, nowthe Attorney General, and modified in accordance with his suggestions
reads as follows:
Article-
In case of the removal of the President from office or of
his death or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the
Vice President, in case of the inability of the President todischarge the powers and duties of the said office, the saidpowers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President as
Acting President until the inability be removed. The Con-
gress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice
88th Cong.
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President, declaring what officer shall then be President,
or in case of inability, act as President, and such officer
shall be or act as President accordingly, until a President
shall be elected or, in case of inability, until the inability
shall be earlier removed. The commencement and termina-
tion of any inability may be determined by such method as
Congress shall by law provide.
I, therefore, propose that we adopt as a constitutional amendment
this proposal which not only bears the imprimatur of the two distin-
guished.men who were then Members of the Senate, Senator Kefauver
and Senator Keating, but which was so persuasively supported by the
Attorney General. He has confirmed to me that he still holds those
views. And in his testimony this year he said only that he would
not insist on the preference he had expressed in the past.
But such a constitutional amendment would be only the beginning.
We must then prepare specific legislation to establish the mechanics
and the details of Presidential succession and inability. It could bein much the same language as that proposed by the Senator from
Indiana for a constitutional amendment.
This course of action has one advantage above all others. It
removes the fear that we may embed in the Constitution procedures
which may not turn out to be workable. If they are in a statute we
can change them. If they become a part of the Constitution, it
would take another constitutional amendment to change them.
Indeed the events of the past few days have created a presumption
and perhaps a conclusive presumption that a constitutional amend-
ment in the form reported will be ill advised. In testimony before
the Committee on the Judiciary of the other body, the Attorney
General has given further indication of doubts he holds about the
adequacy of the language of Senate Joint Resolution 1. Is section 3permitting the President to declare his inability if he transmits adeclaration in writing to the Senate and the House to be used when
the President is having a tooth pulled? Is it to be used when he is
out of the country on a visit to Mexico or to a NATO meeting, orperhaps when he is in the air at any time? If so, then we haveimposed in the Constitution a very cumbersome procedure for him
to take back his powers and duties. We have provided the same
mechanics for an inability of a few minutes, or a few hours, as wehave for long periods of illness.
Then, too, as has been suggested by those who have studied Senate
Joint Resolution 1 in the form reported by the committee, there are
many things which are not covered by the detailed language of this
amendment which perhaps should be covered if we are going into suchdetail instead of adopting broad constitutional language which can be
applied by statute to situations as they may arise. If one of the pur-
poses of the amendment is to provide to the greatest extent possiblefor the filling of the Office of Vice President, have we done so? Whathappens if the President is disabled for many months and the VicePresident assumes his powers and duties as Acting President? Canhe appoint a Vice President, or must that Office remain empty?Surety there is as much chance that some ill may befall the mortal
who is Acting President due to the disability of the President as there
19
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would be if he succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the
President. By moving into this area with a constitutional amend-
ment containing such specifics dealing with the one case we may haveforeclosed ourselves from dealing by statute with other parts of the
problem. On the other hand thle broader language of Senate Joint
Resolution 35, 88th Congress, would permit us to deal with this whole
problem by statute.
And, let us never forget, that it is often argued that because situa..
tions of great variety and complexity may arise a, any time in the
conduct of our foreign relations and in the administration of the laws
which we pass, we should not too tightly or too rigidly control the
exercise of discretion by those who must deal with the problems. Butby writing such specifics into the Constitution as are proposed bySenate Joint Resolution 1 as reported, we are even more tightly and
more rigidly binding ourselves in dealing with the details of problems
of Presidential succession and inability,
We should certainly heed the wisdom of the Attorney General whenhe testified on the merits of the various proposals last y ear and the yearbefore. And we should give thought to the implications of all the
assumptions the Attorney General felt constrained to make when he
testified this year. Let us see what he said:
First, I assume that in using the phrase "majority vote ofboth Houses of Congress" in section 2, and "two-thirds vote
of both Houses" in section 5, what is meant is a majority and
two-thirds vote, respectively, of those Members in each House
present and voting, a quorum being present. This interpre-
tation would be consistent with longstanding precedent (see,
e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919)).Second, I assume that the procedure established by section5 for restoring the President to the powers and duties of his
office is applicable only to instances where the President hasbeen declared disabled without his consent, as provided in
section 4; and that, where the-President has voluntarilydeclared himself unable to act, in accordance with the proce-dure established by section 3, he could restore himself imne-diately to the powers and duties of his office by declaring in
writing that his inability has ended. The subcommittee may
wish to consider whether language to insure this interpreta-tion should be added to section 3.
Third, I assume that even where disability was established
originally pursuant to section 4, the President could resume
the powers and duties of his Office immediately with the
concurrence of the Acting President, and would not be
obliged to await the expiration of the 2-day period
mentioned in section 5.
Fourth, I assume that transmission to the Congress of the
written declarations referred to in section 5 would, if Congress
were not then in session, operate to convene the Congress in
special session so that the matter could be immediately
resolved. In this regard, section 5 might be construed asimpliedly requiring the Acting President to convene a special
session in order to raise an issue as to the President's inabilitypursuant to section 5.
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Further in this connection, I assume that the language usedin section 5 to the effect that Congress "will immediatelydecide" the issue means that if a decision were not reached
by the Congress immediately, the powers and duties of the
Office would revert to the President. This construction is
sufficiently doubtful, however, and the term "immediately"is sufficiently vague, that the subcommittee may wish to
consider adding certainty by including more precise languagein section 5 or by taking action looking toward the making
of appropriate provision in the rules of the House and Senate.
In my testimony during the hearings of 1963, I expressed
the view that the specific procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of the President's inability
should not be written into the Constitution, but instead
should be left to Congress so that the Constitution would
not be encumbered by detail.
The fact that we give heed and thought to these suggestions does
not mean that we do nothing about the problem of presidential
succession and disability. Indeed, we must do something. Let usdo it with the sweep of history in our mind and pen rather than the
shackles of specifics.
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN.
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Agreements devised by the President and his Vice President in past
administrations to cope with an inability crisis are not satisfactory
solutions. Recent history has also made us very much aware of the
need for filling the Office of Vice President when a vacancy arises.
It is abundantly clear that, rather than continue these informal
agreements, the only sound approach is the adoption of a constitu-
tional amendment.
The hearings, which have been held on this important subject in
recent years and in which this Senator has had the opportunity toparticipate, have led me to prefer a different approach than the
present one. As in other legislative matters, the finished product
requires the refinement of individual preferences. In the spirit of
this simple reality, I shall support the proposed amendment. It is
my earnest hope that the Congress and the State legislatures will
approve and ratify it promptly. There is, however, one amendment
which I would urge, as discussed at a later point.
There are two major reasons for my acceptance of the proposed
amendment.
The first is the urgent need for a solution. Differences of opinionin Congress have deprived us of a solution for far too long. It is
time that these constitutional shortcomings be met.Secondly, the proposed language approaches the product which
would have resulted under the proposal which I had urged, so that
this amendment is acceptable.
--Nevertheless, it is in order to state the bases of my earlier prefer-
ence and the preference of three Attorneys General.
The proposed amendment would distinguish the inability situationfrom the three other contingencies of permanent nature; death, resig-
nation, and removal from office, and would recognize that, in the firstinstance, the Vice President becomes Acting President only.
At this point, we encounter the first major difference of opinion.
Some would advocate spelling out the procedure for determininginability within the language of the proposed amendment. 1 dis-
agree with the method of locking into the Constitution those pro-
cedures deemed appropriate today but which, in the light of greaterknowledge and experience may be found wanting tomorrow.
The preferred course would be for the amendment to authorize theCongress to establish an appropriate procedure by law. This practiceparallels the situation of Presidential succession, wherein the power isdelineated by the Constitution but the detail is left for later deter-
mination.
I would also add one fundamental limitation to the process.
I refer to the doctrine of separation of powers. The maintenance
of the three distinct branches of Government, coequal in character,has long been accepted as one of the most important safeguards for
the preservation of the E;.,iublic.
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The executive branch should determine the presence of and termina-
tion of the inability of the President. It is my view that a method
which would involve neither the judicial nor the legislative branch of
the Government would be the better course.
The determination of Presidential inability and its termination is
obviously a factual matter. No policy is involved. The issue is
simply whether a specific individual with certain physical, mental, or
emotional impairments possesses the ability to continue as the Chief
Executive or whether his infirmity is so serious and severe as to renderhim incapable of executing the duties of his Office.
Injecting Congress into the factual question of inability does create
a secondary impeachment procedure, although limited, in which the
conduct of the President would not be the test.
The impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson affords a
clear illustration of the dangers presented when Congress performs ajudicial function. The intrigue and interplay within the Congressduring the impeachment trial serves as a warning of clear and presentdangers which exist when Congress is called upon to consider where to
place the mantle of the presidential powers.
An additional compelling argument for restricting this authority
to the executive branch is that this determination must be made with
a minimum of delay. Although this objection has been alleviated in
the present language, the executive branch is clearly best equipped to
respond promptly as well as effectively in the face of such a crisis.Obviously, such a decision, must rest on the relevant and reliablefacts regarding the President's physical or mental faculties. It mustbe divorced from any thoughts of political advantage, personalprejudice, or other extraneous factors. Those possessing such firsthandinformation about the Chief Executive, or most accessible to it on apersonal basis, are found within the executive branch and not else-
where.
We must be mindful that the President is chosen by the people
of the entire Nation. It is their wish and their right that he serve
as President for the term for which he was chosen. Every sensible and
sympathetic construction favoring his continued performance ofpresidential duties should be accorded him. Indeed, were error tobe committed, it should be in favor of his continuation in office or,
were it interrupted by a disability, by his resumption of the office at
the earliest possible moment upon recovery. The members of the
executive branch are best situated to protect that interest.
What briefly has been developed is the basis of my view thatCongress should not be injected into the decisionmaking process in
cases of presidential inability or recovery.Considerable reference has been made in the discussion of Senate
Joint Resolution 1 to the 76 cosponsors of the proposed resolution.
Cosponsorship of a proposal does not mean acceptance of detail and
the exact text. I am certain that cosponsors do not consider them-
selves bound by a proposal as introduced. Cosponsorship does notindicate a desire to proceed without hearings, deliberation, and amend-
ments in committee as well as on the floor of the Senate. Refine-
ments made by the committee on this measure illustrate that whether
a proposal has a single sponsor or 99 cosponsors, it must be examinedin detail before it is considered by the Senate with a view to changeby amendment or substitution.
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The refinements that have been made on the original language of
Senate Joint Resolution 1 will clarify the detailed procedure to befollowed in a case of disability.
The role of Congress is narrow. It is as an appeal open to the
President from the decision of the Vice President and the members
of the Cabinet. It will be brought into the matter only in thoselimited circumstances where the Vice President, with a majority of
the principal officers of the executive departments, and the Presidentdisagree on the question of inability. It is important to note that
Congress will not have the power to initiate a challenge of the Presi-dent's ability.
The procedure by which Congress shall act is properly left to laterdetermination within rules of each branch thereof. A point of possible
conflict is resolved in the understanding that Congress shall act as
separate bodies and within their respective rules.
The language that "* * * Congress shall immediately proceed todecide the issue" leaves to Congress the determination of what, in
light of the circumstances then existing, must be examined in decidingthe issue. Thus, the matter will be examined on the evidence avail-
able. It is desirable that the matter be examined with a sympathetic
eye toward the President who, after all, is the choice of the electorate.It is apparent that Senate Joint Resolution 1 does have aspects
which alleviate the dangers attendant to a crisis in presidentialinability. Nevertheless, it is felt by this member of the committee
that caution and restraint will be demanded should this inability
measure be called into application.
A time does arrive, however, when we must fill the vacuum. The
points which I have emphasized and previously insisted upon areimportant; but having a solution at this point is more than important,it is urgent. For this reason, I support Senate Joint Resolution 1
and urge its passage. I hope that it will be given expeditious approvalby the other body and early ratification by the required number ofStates.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Section 5 gives the majority of the Cabinet and the Vice President
only 2 days in which to challenge the President's declaration that hisinability has terminated.
This is not enough time considering the gravity of the situation and
the circumstances which might exist.
In the discharge of their duties, members of the Cabinet often travel
widely. There are also long periods of time in which they may not
have had an opportunity to observe and visit with the President so as
to judge whether he has recovered sufficiently to resume his duties.Such periods of inaccessibility might even be longer, in the event of the
President's illness.
The 2-day period should be extended to properly allow for these
factors. I urge amendment of this point to provide additional time.
ROMAN L. HRUSKA.
0
24
